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The following pages contain brief summaries of circuit splits 
identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced between  
September 4, 2014 and February 18, 2015.  This collection, written by the 
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, is organized into civil and 
criminal matters, and then by subject matter and court. 
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split, and is 
intended to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a 
comprehensive analysis.  This compilation makes no claim to be 
exhaustive, but aims to serve the reader well as a referential starting point. 
Preferred citation for the summaries below: Circuit Splits, 11 SETON 
HALL CIR. REV. [n] (2015). 
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CIVIL 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Certification – Class Actions: Shelton v. Bledsoe, 2015 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 253 (3d Cir. Jan. 7, 2015) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether, for the purposes of Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), the identities of members of a class must be 
ascertainable.  Id. at *8.   The court noted that the 1st and 10th Circuits 
rejected any “ascertainability” requirement for the purpose of Rule 
23(b)(2) classes.  Id. at *14.   The court recognized that the 2nd Circuit 
certified classes that were likely unascertainable without addressing the 
issue.  Id.  The court further noted that the Fifth Circuit tied the issue of 
“ascertainability” to the type of relief sought, striking a middle ground.  Id. 
at *16.  The court agreed with the 5th Circuit, and reasoned that Rule 
23(b(2) class actions are indivisible, and organized specifically for certain 
types of relief, specifically injunctions or declaratory judgments.  Id. at 
*11.  Thus, the 3rd Circuit concluded that it was not necessary for a class 
seeking declaratory or injunctive relief to be ascertainable.  Id. at *17–18. 
 
Removal Procedure – Class Action: Romulus v. CVS Pharm. Inc., 770 
F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2014) 
The 1st Circuit addressed the proper interpretation of removal time 
periods under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1446(b)(3).  The court found, based on the text of the statute, that when 
removability is not clear from the initial pleading, section 1446(b)(3) 
requires that the defendant look to the plaintiffs’ subsequent papers to 
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determine whether the “removal clocks” have been triggered.  Id.  at 74.  
The court acknowledged that several circuits have adopted a bright-line 
test, but each differed in their application.  Id.  Both the 7th and 2nd 
Circuits limited the inquiry to the contents of the plaintiff’s complaint or 
later paper.  Id. at 74–75.   The court noted that, where the 7th Circuit 
found that a plaintiff must specifically disclose the amount of monetary 
damages sought in order to trigger § 1446(b)’s deadlines, the 2nd Circuit 
allowed a plaintiff to trigger the removal deadlines by either explicitly 
stating an amount or setting forth facts from which an amount in 
controversy in excess of $5,000,000 can be ascertained.  Id.  In adopting 
the 2nd Circuit’s approach the court found that the thirty-day time under 
28 U.S.C.S. § 1446(b)(3) was triggered only when the plaintiffs’ 
complaint or plaintiffs’ subsequent paper provides the defendant a clear 
statement of the damages sought or with sufficient facts from which 
damages can be readily calculated.  Id. at 69–70. 
 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction – Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
§ 27: Manning v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 772 F.3d 
158 (3d Cir. 2014) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed “whether the exclusive jurisdiction 
provision in § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . provide[s] a 
more expansive basis for federal-question jurisdiction.”  Id. at 165–66.  
The court noted that the 2nd Circuit found that where the court has 
determined that a plaintiff’s state law claim does not arise under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 federal-question jurisdiction, federal jurisdiction cannot 
alternatively be created under § 27, because § 27 “plainly refers to claims 
created by the Act or by rules promulgated thereunder, but not to claims 
created by state law.”  Id. at 166.  Conversely, the 9th Circuit held that for 
claims raised under § 27, it is immaterial whether those claims arose under 
§ 1331 because § 27 creates a more expansive basis for federal-question 
jurisdiction.  Id.  The 3rd Circuit joined the 2nd Circuit and concluded that 
the exclusive jurisdiction provision in § 27 does not provide for an 
independent basis of jurisdiction.  Id.  at 167–68. 
CIVIL RIGHTS 
Standing – The Rehabilitation Act of 1973: McCullum v. Orlando 
Reg’l Healthcare Sys., 768 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 2014) 
The 11th Circuit addressed whether the scope of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 (“RA”) grants standing to non-disabled persons.  Id. at 1142.  
The 11th Circuit recognized that the 2nd Circuit has broadly interpreted 
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standing under the RA.  Id. at 1144.  The 2nd Circuit held that “non-
disabled plaintiffs were aggrieved within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.S. 
§ 794a(a)(2) so long as they could show ‘an independent injury casually 
related to the denial of federally required services to the disabled persons 
with whom [they] are associated” and that prior 2nd Circuit precedent 
interpreted associational standing “as broadly as possible under the 
Constitution, irrespective of  § 794(a).” Id.  The 11th Circuit disagreed 
with the 2nd Circuit and found that a party is “aggrieved” within the 
meaning of § 794a(a)(2) only if she is personally excluded, denied 
benefits, or discriminated against because of her association with a 
disabled person” and the associational standing provision should not be 
interpreted “irrespective of [the language of § 794(a)].”  Id.  Thus, the 11th 
Circuit concluded that non-disabled plaintiffs lack standing to sue under 
the RA.  Id. at 1145. 
Statutory Interpretation – Civil Rights Act of 1991: Brown v. 
Sessoms, 774 F.3d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed 
whether Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701(1989) 
determined that the express action at law provided by 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 
advances the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of the 
rights guaranteed by 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981 when the claim is pressed against 
a state actor.  Id. at 1021.  The court noted that 9th Circuit determined that 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 overruled Jett.  Id.  Yet, the court agreed with 
the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 10th, and 11th Circuits in finding that 
that Jett remains good law, and consequently, that § 1983 remains the 
exclusive remedy for violations of § 1981 committed by state actors.  Id.  
The court reasoned that if Congress had intended to nullify Jeff, the Civil 
Rights Act and its legislative history would have named it alongside 
several Supreme Court decisions included in the Civil Rights Act, which 
the Civil Rights Act is intended to overrule.  Id.  Nonetheless, Jett was not 
identified even though it was decided less than two years before Congress 
acted, and thus, the court concluded that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did 
not overrule Jett.  Id. at 1022. 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 
Employment Retirement Income Security Act – Finality of Remand 
Orders: Mead v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 768 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2014) 
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether plan administrator remand orders 
under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) are 
considered final decisions subject to appeal.  Id. at 107.  The court noted 
386 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 11:381 
that the majority of circuits, including the 1st, 4th, 6th, 8th, and 11th 
Circuits, have held that “because an ERISA remand order contemplates 
further proceedings before the plan administrator, it is not ‘final’ and 
therefore may not be immediately appealed.”  Id.  However, the 3rd, 9th, 
and 10th Circuits held that these remand orders are final.  Id.  The 7th 
Circuit, standing alone, has analyzed the “finality of ERISA remand orders 
by reference to the statute governing remands to the Social Security 
Administration,” found at 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  Id.  After analyzing prior 
case law and the various approaches taken by its sister circuits, the 2nd 
Circuit joined the 1st, 4th, 6th, 8th, and 11th Circuits and held that plan 
administrator remand orders are generally not final and therefore should 
not be subject to appeal.  Id. at 109. 
 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 
Fair Labor Standards Act–Pleadings: Landers v. Quality Communs., 
Inc., 771 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2014) 
The 9th Circuit addressed the “degree of specificity required to state 
a claim for failure to pay minimum wages or overtime wages under the 
[Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)]” in light of Twombly and Iqbal.  Id. at 
640.  The court noted that the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Circuits determined that 
“in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff asserting a claim to 
overtime payments must specifically allege that she worked more than 
forty hours in a given workweek without being compensated for the 
overtime hours worked during that  workweek.” Id. at 644-45. Conversely, 
the 11th Circuit found that in order to state a plausible claim for relief, the 
plaintiff need only state that the employer in question violated the FLSA 
by failing to pay minimum hourly wages and failing to pay overtime in 
hours worked over 40 hours.”  Id. at 645.  The 9th Circuit joined the 1st, 
2nd, and 3rd Circuits and held that “detailed factual allegations regarding 
the number of overtime hours worked are not required to state a plausible 
claim . . . [but] conclusory allegations that merely recite the statutory 
language are [not] adequate.”  Id. at 644. 
IMMIGRATION LAW 
Immigration and Nationality Act – Waiver of Inadmissibility: Husic 
v. Holder, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 264 (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 2015) 
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether an alien who lawfully entered the 
country without lawful permanent resident (′′LPR′′) status but later 
adjusted to LPR status is eligible to seek a waiver of inadmissibility under 
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the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(h).  Id. at *2.  The court 
rejected the 8th Circuit’s interpretation that an alien is “lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence” when he obtains LPR status following an 
approval of application for adjustment.  Id. at *8–9.  The court reasoned 
that because the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), expressly defined “admitted” to mean “[t]he lawful 
entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization 
by an immigration officer,′′ that adjustment of status was not contemplated 
and therefore not relevant to “lawful entry.”  Id. at *12–13.  The court 
joined seven sister Circuits to find that when an alien is admitted into the 
United States as a visitor, but later attains LPR status by adjustment, then 
the alien is not “an alien who has previously been admitted to the United 
States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”  Id. at *1.  
The court concluded that such an alien is eligible to seek a waiver under 
INA § 212(h) if the Attorney General chooses to exercise favorable 
discretion.  Id. at *1,*6, *15–17. 
PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION 
Investment Company Act of 1940 – Factors for determining whether 
a statute grants a private right of action: Laborers’ Local 265 Pension 
Fund v. iShares Trust, 769 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2014) 
The 6th Circuit addressed “whether § 36(a) of the [Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (“ICA”)] provides an implied private right of 
action.”  Id. at 406.   The court noted that, while a circuit split does exist 
as to this issue, all of the circuit courts that have decided this issue in the 
wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 
275 (2001), have held that “an implied private right of action does not 
exist.”  Id.  In interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision, the 6th Circuit 
determined that the threshold question is “whether the text or the structure 
of the ICA indicates an intent by Congress to create an implied private 
right of action under § 36(a).”  Id. at 407.  In analyzing the plain language 
of the Act, specifically the first sentence of § 36(a) which states “[t]he 
commission is authorized to bring an action . . . ” and the fact that § 36(b) 
expressly creates a private right of action, court concluded that “neither 
the text nor the structure of the ICA demonstrates an intent by Congress to 
provide an implied private right of action under § 36(a).”  Id. at 408. 
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CRIMINAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
First Amendment – Freedom of Speech: United States v. Heineman, 
767 F.3d 970 (10th Cir. 2014) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), as construed 
in Virginia v. Black et al., 538 U.S. 343 (2003), “requires the government 
to prove in any true-threat prosecution that the defendant intended the 
recipient to feel threatened.”  Id. at 975.  The 10th Circuit recognized that 
the 7th and 9th Circuits have embraced a “natural reading” of Black’s 
definition of true threats.  Id. at 979.  Consequently, like the 7th and 9th 
Circuits, the 10th Circuit interpreted Black as establishing that a defendant 
can be “constitutionally convicted of making a true threat only if the 
defendant intended the recipient of the threat to feel threatened.”  Id. at 
978.  The 10th Circuit disagreed with the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 8th, and 11th 
Circuits, which all declined to read Black as “imposing a subjective-intent 
requirement.”  Id.  The 10th Circuit read Black as imposing a subjective-
intent requirement.  Id.  Thus, the 10th Circuit concluded that lower courts 
must determine whether the defendant “intended to instill fear before it 
could convict him of violating § 875(c).”  Id. at 981–82. 
 
First Amendment: Freedom of Speech: iMatter Utah v. Njord, 2014 
U.S. App. LEXIS 24164 (10th Cir. Dec. 22, 2014) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether “the government must exempt 
indigent applications from otherwise-constitutional permit requirements 
that they cannot afford.”  Id. at 1264.  The court recognized that the 3rd 
and 11th Circuits have held “that permits for First Amendment Activity 
cannot be conditioned on the applicant’s ability to pay.”  Id.  However, the 
court also noted that the 1st and 6th Circuits held “that no indigency waiver 
is required, at least where there remain ample alternative forums for the 
speech.”  Id.  The 10th Circuit agreed with the 1st and 6th Circuits, and 
held that “the Constitution does not mandate an indigency exception to an 
otherwise-valid permit requirement” so long as ample alternative forums 
for speech exist.  Id. 
 
Sixth Amendment – Tribal court convictions: United States v. Bryant, 
769 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2014) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether, in a prosecution under 18 
U.S.C.S. § 117(a), the government may use prior tribal court convictions 
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that were obtained in the absence of counsel.  Id. at 673.  The court noted 
that the 8th and 10th Circuits held that “a prior uncounseled tribal court 
conviction could be used as a predicate offense for a § 117(a) prosecution” 
because the Sixth Amendment does not apply in tribal court and thus using 
a tribal court conviction in a subsequent prosecution cannot violate 
the Sixth Amendment.  Id. at 678.  The court further noted that 9th 
Circuit’s previous ruling in United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 
1989) contradicted the views of the 8th and 10th Circuits.  Id.  The 9th 
Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Ant that the government may not rely on 
tribal court convictions as predicate offenses in § 117(a) prosecutions 
unless the tribal court afforded the same right to counsel as guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment in federal and state prosecutions. Id. at 679.  Thus, 
the 9th Circuit followed its prior precedent, which prohibits the use of 
tribal court convictions in §117(a) prosecutions.  Id. 
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Acts and Mental States – Mens Rea in Making Threats: United States 
v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970 (10th Cir. 2014) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether “the First Amendment, as 
construed in [Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)], require[s] the 
government to prove in any true-threat prosecution that the defendant 
intended the recipient to feel threatened.”   Id. at 975.   The court 
considered varying interpretations of language used in Black, noting that 
the 9th and 7th Circuits determined that there is a subjective intent 
requirement, while the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 8th, and 11th Circuits declined to 
apply a subjective intent analysis.   Id. at 979.   The 10th Circuit agreed 
with the 9th Circuit, reasoning that subjective intent must be required, as 
it “was the [Supreme] Court’s view that a threat was unprotected by the 
First Amendment only if the speaker intended to instill fear in the 
recipient.”  Id. at 980.   The court reasoned that, if subjective intent was 
not required, the Black majority would not have used subjective intent as 
a basis for invalidating the statute at issue. Id.  In doing so, the court 
rejected the opposing circuits’ argument that the language in Black 
contained any ambiguity about what a speaker must intend.   Id.   Rather, 
the 10th Circuit ultimately concluded that, “a defendant can be 
constitutionally convicted of making a true threat only if the defendant 
intended the recipient of the threat to feel threatened.”   Id. at 978. 
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Habeas Corpus – Statutory Time Bar: Ezell v. United States, 2015 
U.S. App. LEXIS 1067 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 2015) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether the gatekeeping procedures in 28 
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D) are mandatory or hortatory when considering 
second or successive 28 U.SC. § 2255 habeas corpus petitions.  Id. at *5.  
The court noted that the 1st, 4th, 6th, 7th and 10th Circuits have held the 
time limit is hortatory, while the 11th Circuit considers this provision 
mandatory.  Id.  The 9th Circuit agreed with the 1st, 4th, 6th, 7th and 10th 
Circuits and held that when a when a § 2255 motion presents a complex 
issue, the court may exceed the thirty-day time limit of § 2244(b)(3)(D).  
Id.  The court noted that the 6th Circuit found that “a statutory time period 
providing a directive to an agency or public official is not ordinarily 
mandatory unless it both expressly requires [the] agency or public official 
to act within a particular time period and specifies a consequence for 
failure to comply with the provision.” Id. at *6 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The court reasoned that when a statutory period fails to specify 
a consequence for noncompliance, a court is not deprived of the power to 
grant the successive motion.  Id.  Thus, the 9th Circuit held that the thirty-
day statutory time limit of § 2244 is hortatory, not mandatory, and can be 
exceeded when a § 2255 petition presents a complex issue.  Id. 
 
Plea Agreement—Government Withdrawal of Plea Agreement: 
United States v. Haynes, 579 F. App’x 473 (6th Cir. 2014). 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether the government must grant an 
evidentiary hearing when a Rule 35(b) motion is withdrawn.   Id. at 
479.   The court noted that the 2nd Circuit had previously held that an 
evidentiary hearing is appropriate in these circumstances, because of the 
possibility of a bad faith review.   Id. at 842.   Further, the court noted that 
the 3rd Circuit held that the standard of review is limited to 
“unconstitutional motives.”  Id.  The 6th Circuit agreed with the 3rd 
Circuit and concluded that when a plea agreement affords the government 
“complete discretion” to file a motion for a downward departure, their 
standard of review is limited to the “unconstitutional motives” 
standard.   Id. 
REMEDIES 
Penalties –Mandatory Victims Restitution Act: United States v. 
Kieffer, 2014 U.S. App.  LEXIS 24173 (10th Cir. December 22, 2014) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether restitution under the Mandatory 
Victims Restitution Act is a criminal penalty, subject to the requirement 
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that a jury must first consider the evidence before a criminal fine is 
imposed.  Id. at *23 – 25.  While the 1st and 8th Circuits both found that 
restitution is a criminal penalty, the 9th Circuit held that it is a criminal 
penalty only under certain circumstances.  Id. at *25 – 26.  Conversely, the 
10th Circuit reasoned that “the purpose of restitution is to restore victims, 
not punish offenders; therefore restitution may be ordered by a district 
court without an evidentiary finding made by a jury.  Id. at *25–26. Thus, 
the 10th Circuit concluded that “restitution is a civil remedy designed to 
compensate victims – not a criminal penalty.”  Id. at *25. 
 
